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Probability, Presumptions and Evidentiary Burdens in Antitrust Analysis: 
Revitalizing the Rule of Reason for Exclusionary Conduct 
By 
Andrew I. Gavil* & Steven C. Salop** 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Conservative commentary has long been skeptical of exclusionary conduct allegations, 
even those involving firms with substantial market power. This conservative critique of antitrust 
law has been highly influential and has facilitated a transformation of antitrust standards of conduct 
since the 1970s. The combination of objections from the business community, conservative 
academic criticism, and political change launched a generation-long movement toward 
increasingly more permissive standards of conduct.  
Although these changes have taken many forms, all were influenced by a common and 
repeated message: competition law was over-deterrent. It was prone to condemn conduct that was 
likely beneficial in many instances, or competitively inconsequential at worst. Conservatives 
attributed this tendency to bright line rules of liability, undemanding burdens of proof of 
anticompetitive effect, lack of appreciation for efficiency, and the limited competence of antitrust 
decision-makers to correctly differentiate procompetitive from anticompetitive conduct. These 
commentators also espoused a range of presumptions that previously suspect types of exclusionary 
conduct were more likely procompetitive and that even highly concentrated markets were likely 
to perform well.1 
Critics relied heavily on the assumption that the costs of false positive errors (i.e., erroneous 
convictions and over-deterrence) far exceeded the costs of false negatives (i.e., erroneous 
acquittals and under-deterrence). They further assumed that the effects of false positives would be 
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 In this article, we differentiate “assumptions” from “presumptions”—a term of more specific meaning in the 
context of litigation and burdens of proof. As we explain in Parts II and III, infra, many mistaken conservative 
assumptions have provided the basis for the equivalent of procompetitive presumptions in antitrust law. 
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durable because court decisions would have lasting impact. By contrast, they assumed that the 
effects of false negatives would largely be dissipated by the self-correcting tendencies of markets.2  
The proscribed cure was a combination of greater economic sophistication, lessened 
reliance on bright-line rules of liability, and greater reliance on bright-line rules of non-liability. 
The influence of this approach did not stop with the analysis of particular practices. The emphasis 
on false positives provided a lodestar for the analysis of various legal rules3 and it became a 
barometer for measuring the wisdom of prohibitions.4 This translated into a higher evidentiary 
burden on plaintiffs in cases alleging exclusionary conduct, especially a requirement of more 
economic evidence to support competitive harm allegations.   
Many of the assumptions that guided this generation-long retrenchment of antitrust rules 
were mistaken and advances in the law and in economic analysis have rendered them 
anachronistic. This is particularly the case with respect to exclusionary conduct.5 As Professor 
Jonathan Baker has observed, rote invocation of error cost analysis can itself produce errors, 
particularly with respect to exclusionary conduct.6 Continued reliance on what are now 
exaggerated fears of “false positives,” and failure adequately to consider the harm from “false 
negatives,” has led courts to impose excessive demands of proof on plaintiffs that belie both 
established procedural norms and sound economic analysis. The result is not better and more 
reasonable antitrust standards, but instead an embedded ideological preference for non-
intervention and a “thumb on the scales”7 that creates a tendency toward false negatives, 
particularly in modern markets characterized by economies of scale and network effects. Indeed, 
the effect goes well beyond a “thumb,” because it effectively shifts the default presumption from 
neutral to pro-defense. There are also excessive administrative costs, as ever “more” evidence is 
                                                 
2
 For one of the oft-cited illustrations of this set of arguments, see Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 
TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (1984). For a criticism of its approach, see Oliver E. Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 GEO. 
L.J. 271, 281–89 (1987). 
3
 For an explanation, see Jonathan B. Baker, Taking the Error Out of ‘Error Cost’ Analysis: What’s Wrong with 
Antitrust’s Right, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 5–7 (2015). 
4
 See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004) (“Mistaken 
inferences and the resulting false condemnations are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the 
antitrust laws are designed to protect . . . . The cost of false positives counsels against an undue expansion of § 2 
liability.”) (internal quotation mark omitted); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 
(1986); Ball Mem’l Hosp. Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1333–34 (7th Cir. 1986). 
5
 See, e.g., Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, Contracts as a Barrier to Entry, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 388 (1987); 
Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power 
over Price, 96 Yale L.J. 209 (1986); Eric B. Rasmusen et al., Naked Exclusion, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 1137 (1991); 
Michael H. Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 63 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 513 (1995); Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837 (1990); B. 
Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, Exclusive Dealing, 106 J. POLIT. ECON. 64 (1998). 
6
 Baker, supra note 3, at 37 (“In applying decision theory, a neutral economic tool, to the analysis of antitrust rules, 
contemporary conservatives have made a series of erroneous assumptions, which collectively impart a non-
interventionist bias to their conclusions. These assumptions systematically overstate the incidence and significance 
of false positives, understate the incidence and significance of false negatives, and understate the net benefits of 
various rules by overstating their costs.”). See also JONATHAN B. BAKER, THE ANTITRUST PARADIGM: RESTORING A 
COMPETITIVE ECONOMY 73–77 (2019) (discussing relationship of error-cost analysis to legal presumptions). 
7
 See Baker, supra note 3, at 6.  
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demanded, without regard for its cost or whether it is likely to significantly improve the accuracy 
of decisions.   
In this article, we build on this prior work to explain how these erroneous assumptions 
about markets, institutions, and conduct have distorted the antitrust decision-making process and 
produced an excessive risk of false negatives in exclusionary conduct cases involving firms 
attempting to achieve, maintain, or enhance dominance or substantial market power. To redress 
this imbalance, we integrate modern economic analysis and the teaching of decision theory with 
the foundational conventions of antitrust law, which has long relied on probability, presumptions, 
and reasonable inferences to provide effective means for evaluating competitive effects and 
resolving antitrust claims.  
In Part I, we review the essential role that probability, presumptions, and inferences have 
played in shaping antitrust law’s approach to defining evidentiary burdens. In Part II, we briefly 
explain the role decision theory should play in designing antitrust rules in the context of current 
case law and economic learning and critically examine the Chicago-School critiques of 1960s 
antitrust and explain why their relevance is much reduced today. In Part III, we propose a series 
of guiding principles and advocate for easing of the burdens placed on plaintiffs to establish 
anticompetitive harm. We propose eliminating continued reliance on the unwarranted assumptions 
that have raised the plaintiff’s burden in exclusionary conduct cases and tipped the litigation scales 
in favor of defendants and provide suggestions for how procompetitive presumptions might be 
more narrowly tailored. 
 
I. THE RULE OF REASON, COMPETITIVE HARM, AND THE ROLE OF PROBABILITY, INFERENCE 
AND PRESUMPTION   
 A. The Origins of the Rule of Reason 
 From its emergence in Standard Oil,8 the rule of reason has been rooted in probability, not 
certainty.9 The Court explained that conduct could be deemed “unreasonably restrictive of 
competitive conditions” if it “were of such a character as to give rise to the inference or 
presumption” that it was “restraining the free flow of commerce and tending to bring about the 
                                                 
8
 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911). 
9
 See Jonathan B. Baker & Andrew I. Gavil, Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg and Antitrust Law’s Rule(s) of Reason, 
forthcoming in DOUGLAS GINSBURG: AN ANTITRUST PROFESSOR ON THE BENCH, LIBER AMICORUM - VOL. II 
(Nicolas Charbit, ed., 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3349853 (explaining that, Standard Oil  intended the “rule of 
reason” to be applied to claims under both Sections 1 and 2); Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, Preserving 
Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 617, 647–48, 659–65 
(1999). See also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (explaining that the Supreme 
Court in Standard Oil used “rule of reason” to “describe the proper inquiry under both” Section 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Act).  
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evils, such as enhancement of prices, which were considered to be against public policy.10 Seven 
years later, the Court again emphasized the probabilistic nature of judgments under the rule of 
reason in Board of Trade of the City of Chicago.11 In Justice Brandeis’ “classic” statement of the 
rule of reason, he explained that the court “must ordinarily consider . . . the nature of the restraint 
and its effect, actual or probable.”12 
 From these two pillars, the modern rule of reason with its focus on competitive effects later 
developed in National Society of Professional Engineers13 and National Collegiate Athletic 
Association.14 Writing for the Court in both cases, Justice Stevens drew heavily on Standard Oil 
and Chicago Board of Trade, synthesizing the key elements of presumption, inference, and 
probability. He explained that unreasonableness could be based on either “the nature or character 
of the contracts, or . . . on surrounding circumstances giving rise to the inference or presumption 
that they were intended to restrain trade and enhance prices.”15 Probabilistic assessments of likely 
competitive harm clearly also are the basis of the “per se rule,” an application of the rule of reason 
that irrebuttably presumes conduct will restrain competition unreasonably.16  
 Although the rule of reason has evolved mainly in the context of Section 1 horizontal 
restraints law, this learning applies equally to exclusionary conduct cases under both Sections 1 
and 2. The burden-shifting rule of reason has been used in concerted exclusionary conduct cases 
like Visa17 and RealComp II.18 It also has been used to structure the analysis in several leading 
Section 2 cases involving single firm conduct, including Microsoft,19 McWane,20 and ZF Meritor.21 
                                                 
10
 Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 58 (emphasis added). The Court also noted that the use of “presumptions” in 
interpreting and applying the Sherman Act was rooted in the common law, on which its core prohibitions were 
modelled. Id. at 52. 
11
 Bd. of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918) (“Chicago Board of Trade”). 
12
 Id. at 238 (emphasis added). See also Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 203 n.10 (2010) 
(“Justice Brandeis provided the classic formulation of the Rule of Reason in Board of Trade of Chicago v. United 
States.”). 
13
 Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs. v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (“Professional Engineers”). Professional 
Engineers also emphasized that the rule of reason focuses on competitive effects. Id. at 692 (“[T]he purpose of the 
analysis is to form a judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint.”). See also Steven C. Salop, The 
First Principles Approach to Antitrust, Kodak and Antitrust at the Millennium, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 187 (2000) 
(advocating “first principles” approach to evaluating market power and anticompetitive effects). 
14
 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (“NCAA”). 
15
 Professional Engineers , 435 U.S. at 690 (emphasis added). 
16
 See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940) (price-fixing agreements 
“banned because of their actual or potential threat” to competition); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 
(1958) (agreements highly likely to be anticompetitive are “conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore 
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use”). 
17
 United States v. Visa USA, Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir. 2003). 
18
 Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815, 825–26 (6th Cir. 2011). 
19
 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
20
 McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 833 (11th Cir. 2015). 
21
 ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 281–82 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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Indeed, Standard Oil involved exclusionary conduct  and included claims under both Sections 1 
and 2.22   
 B. Satisfying the Plaintiff’s Burden of Production 
 As the rule of reason evolved, this reliance on probabilistic assessments of likely harm 
remained one of its core characteristics. Per se prohibition was reserved for conduct with a very 
high probability of harm. In other cases, the level of scrutiny and the likelihood of liability were 
calibrated to the nature and strength of the evidence of probable harm, whether circumstantial or 
direct, as well as presumptions based on the nature of the restraint, experience and the overarching 
goals of the Sherman Act.  
Presumptions have consistently played a role in antitrust law when the prediction of 
competitive harm is deemed sound and, in some cases, when combined with some limited market-
specific analysis.23 NCAA, Indiana Federation of Dentists,24 and California Dental25 further 
developed that long-standing role. A plaintiff can meet its burden of production through a 
rebuttable anticompetitive presumption when economic theory predicts a relatively high or 
“obvious” probability of competitive harm.26 Courts also recognized that a plaintiff could meet its 
burden of production for competitive harm with a “double inference:”27 Courts could infer market 
power from high market shares and other factors in a defined market; combining this inference 
with conduct that has a tendency to be anticompetitive, competitive harm could then be inferred—
precisely because that tendency increases in the presence of market power.28 Finally, the Court 
also recognized that when direct evidence of probable anticompetitive effect is proffered, neither 
presumption nor inference is required.29  
                                                 
22
 See supra note 9. 
23
 See, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs. v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693–94 (1978); Polygram Holding, Inc. v. 
FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 37–38 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  
24
 FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (“Indiana Federation of Dentists”). 
25
 California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 758 (1999). 
26
 Id. at 770. See also Polygram Holding, 416 F.3d at 36–37. The strongest rule of reason cases from the perspective 
of the plaintiff will include both direct and circumstantial evidence of harm. See, e.g., Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635 
F.3d 815, 827–34 (6th Cir. 2011) (evaluating both direct and circumstantial evidence of competitive harm under the 
rule of reason). The Supreme Court’s decisions in NCAA and Indiana Federation of Dentists were part of a larger 
movement to alleviate the burden of production (and proof) on plaintiffs in cases involving relatively more obvious 
anticompetitive conduct. See Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The Modern Rule 
of Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 755–57 (2012). 
27
 For an explanation of this “double inference” method of establishing competitive harm, see ANDREW I. GAVIL, ET 
AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 544–45 (3d ed. 
2017).  
28
 See, e.g., Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815, 823 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Realcomp's substantial market power, 
combined with the likely anticompetitive tendencies of its policies, rendered the policies unreasonable due to their 
likely anticompetitive effects.”). 
29
 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984) (“[W]hen 
there is an agreement not to compete in terms of price or output, ‘no elaborate industry analysis is required to 
demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an agreement.’”) (quoting Nat’l Soc’y Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 
692); FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460–61 (2009) (“‘[P]roof of actual detrimental effects, such as 
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In evidentiary terms, direct evidence of probable competitive harm can eliminate the need 
to rely on circumstantial evidence, and hence either presumption or inference.30 This is not, 
however, a short cut or “quick look” that somehow avoids a showing of market power.31 Quite to 
the contrary, when direct evidence of competitive harm is available, market power also has been 
shown.32 The Court did not suggest that such direct proof was a requirement of rule of reason 
analysis, but rather that such proof met the plaintiff’s burden of production and hence eliminated 
the necessity of reliance on circumstantial evidence.33 
 Indeed, direct evidence of anticompetitive effects on price and output also can be sufficient 
to rebut a defendant’s efficiency justifications. When direct evidence of anticompetitive effects 
has been shown (and not undermined), the plaintiff in effect has preemptively shown that any 
procompetitive benefits were inadequate to eliminate the demonstrated anticompetitive effects in 
the market.34  
 C. The “Enquiry Meet for the Case” 
 In moving away from reliance on bright line approaches, the courts continued to use 
probability assessments to apply the rule of reason flexibly, depending on the strength of the 
evidence presented by the parties and by recognizing appropriate presumptions. A more precise 
statement of the “per se rule,” for example, is “per se unreasonableness”—an application of the 
rule of reason that involves an irrebuttable presumption that the conduct is highly likely to 
unreasonably restrain competition.35 Similarly, what has been labelled the “quick look” can be 
understood as courts utilizing a rebuttable presumption when the probability of competitive harm 
is relatively high, albeit not as high as with per se unreasonableness.  
 This approach reached fruition in California Dental Association.36 The Court made it clear 
that the rule of reason is a sliding-scale and that evidence of anticompetitive effects varies and 
                                                 
a reduction of output,’ can obviate the need for an inquiry into market power, which is but a ‘surrogate for 
detrimental effects.’”) (quoting PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1511, at 429 (3d ed. 1986)). 
30
 Similarly, courts in conspiracy cases do not rely on “plus factor” analysis to infer agreement when there is direct 
evidence of agreement, such as bylaws or contract, or communications revealing a conspiracy. See, e.g., In re High 
Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 661–62 (7th Cir. 2002) (explaining that direct evidence in 
Section 1 conspiracy is “evidence tantamount to an acknowledgement of guilt”). 
31
 Assembling direct evidence of harm is not necessarily “quick” relative to the circumstantial route. Obtaining 
direct proof may require significant investigation and evidence gathering. Direct proof also is likely to involve 
different economic methods, although there may overlap with direct evidence of market power. 
32
 See supra note 26. See also infra note 87. 
33
 See, e.g., Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (rejecting argument that quick look 
approach is only available when evidence of actual harm is proffered). 
34
 See, e.g., Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 461 (“The finding of actual, sustained adverse effects on 
competition in those areas where IFD dentists predominated, viewed in light of the reality that markets for dental 
services tend to be relatively localized, is legally sufficient to support a finding that the challenged restraint was 
unreasonable even in the absence of elaborate market analysis.”). 
35
 This view was not entirely new, as the Court had observed in the late 1950s that what was being referred to as the 
“per se rule” was a “principle of per se unreasonableness.” See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 
(1958).  
36
 California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 758 (1999). 
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must be evaluated in the context of each case.37 The strength of any presumption of competitive 
harm affects the burden on the plaintiff to undertake market analysis. It also correspondingly 
affects the defendant’s evidentiary burden to rebut evidence or presumption of harm. This is the 
“enquiry meet for the case.” It synthesized the Court’s previous decisions describing the rule of 
reason inquiry as focused on the probability—on tendencies—of competitive harm.38 But as the 5-
4 division in the Court illustrated, that formulation leaves room for disagreements about the 
quantity and quality of evidence needed to support an inference of probable competitive harm.   
D. Developing New Presumptions 
The rule of reason and its presumptions should continue to evolve over time as economic 
learning advances and courts gain further experience. Leegin39 and Actavis40 invited lower courts 
to do so: to consider the adoption of appropriate presumptions based on experience in applying the 
rule of reason (respectively) to intrabrand vertical price agreements and pay-for-delay cases. In 
this regard, after discussing the decision theory framework and examining certain assumptions 
made by conservative commentators and the presumptions that flow from those assumptions, we 
propose principles to guide the evolution of the rule of reason for exclusionary conduct in today’s 
modern marketplace. Our goal is to avoid the excessive false negatives that are highly likely to 
flow from unduly permissive antitrust rules grounded in outdated non-interventionist presumptions 
and assumptions. 
 
II:  ACHIEVING A SOUND DECISION-THEORETIC APPROACH TO ANTITRUST LEGAL STANDARDS FOR 
EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT 
A. Decision Theory and Probabilistic Competitive Harm  
It has been recognized for decades that decision theory is useful for understanding and 
formulating legal standards.41 Making legal decisions based on probability, inferences and 
presumptions is consistent with a decision-theoretic approach to legal rules. Decision theory 
provides a methodology for information-gathering and decision-making when outcomes are 
uncertain, information is inherently imperfect, and information is costly to obtain. This 
                                                 
37
 Id. See also FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 159–60 (2013). 
38
 This approach also aligned the rule of reason as applied under Section 1 with the structured approaches that the 
Court, and the lower courts, had been developing in other areas of antitrust law, including monopolization under 
Section 2. See Baker & Gavil, supra note 9. 
39
 Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 898–99 (2007) (“Courts can, for example, devise 
rules over time for offering proof, or even presumptions where justified, to make the rule of reason a fair and 
efficient way to prohibit anticompetitive restraints and to promote procompetitive ones.”) (emphasis added). 
40
 Actavis, 570 U.S. at 159–60. 
41
 There is a large literature on the application of decision theory to antitrust. See, e.g., Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. 
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974); C. Frederick Beckner III & 
Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 41 (1999). For further discussion of its 
application in assigning burdens of proof, see Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L.J. 738 (2012); Edward 
K. Cheng, Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof, 122 YALE L.J. 1254 (2013). 
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methodology is a rational process in which a decision-maker begins with initial beliefs (i.e., 
presumptions) based on prior knowledge and then gathers additional information (i.e., evidence) 
to supplement the presumption in order to make a better, more accurate decision.42  
Decision theory recognizes that some erroneous decisions are inevitable because it is not 
economical, or even possible, to achieve perfect information. Even if the evidence suggests that 
the conduct in a particular case is beneficial, the conduct actually may be harmful, or vice versa. 
Formulating an optimal legal standard would involve balancing to the extent possible the expected 
consumer welfare harm from “false positive” errors (i.e., erroneously prohibiting beneficial 
conduct) versus “false negative” errors (i.e., erroneously permitting harmful conduct). Analysis of 
error costs would require information on the incidence and consequences of error. The analysis 
also would take into account the impact of the legal rule on deterrence, that is, on future 
participants’ choice of conduct in light of the legal standard.43 It also could take into account the 
cost of the administrative process, including the cost of delay. 
Presumptions also play a key role in setting evidentiary burdens under the rule of reason. 
The recognition of a presumption is a question of law. The court would identify and gauge the 
strength of its initial economic presumption regarding the likely competitive impact of the conduct. 
This presumption would be rationally based on logic, experience, and economic evidence about 
the industry and the category of conduct.44 The presumption regarding the category of conduct 
could be anticompetitive, procompetitive, or neutral (i.e., equally likely to be anticompetitive or 
procompetitive). The strength of the presumption would vary with the degree of variation in the 
likely effects of the conduct. Because any single district court is likely to have very limited 
information about the probable categorical effects of conduct, appellate courts and the Supreme 
Court have typically been better positioned to make judgments about presumptions.  
                                                 
42
 See, e.g., John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065, 1084–86 (1968); 
MORRIS DE GROOT, OPTIMAL STATISTICAL DECISIONS 135–40 (1970); HOWARD RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS: 
INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON CHOICES UNDER UNCERTAINTY 27–33 (1968). In the language of Bayesian 
probability theory, the decision-maker begins with a “prior” probability, gathers information, and then forms a 
“posterior” probability by rationally combining the prior probability and the information. Here we are not using 
“presumption” in the formal legal sense, but as a synonym for “assumptions” or “priors.” 
43
 Deterrence effects are distinguishable from the issue of judicial errors for a given legal standard. For example, a 
rule of per se legality would be easy to administer and would not lead a district court to issue erroneous “false 
convictions.” But, such a legal standard might not be optimal because it would not deter any anticompetitive conduct 
in that category. For discussion of deterrence, see Ronald J. Allen & Alex Stein, Evidence, Probability, and the 
Burden of Proof, 54 ARIZONA L. REV. 557, 580, 593 (2013). False positives as well as false negatives tend to lead to 
under-deterrence of anticompetitive conduct in some circumstances. Steven C. Salop, Merger Settlements and 
Enforcement Policy for Optimal Deterrence and Maximum Welfare, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2647, 2668–69, 2669 
n.60 (2013) (compliance incentives decrease when the probability of error of either type increases).  
44
 A key assumption of decision theory is that the initial presumptions of the court are rational and accurate. 
Confirmation bias involves (unconsciously) interpreting evidence as supporting one’s prior views, which amounts to 
dysfunctional Bayesian inference. For one survey, see Raymond S Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous 
Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GENERAL PSYCHOL. 175 (1998). 
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A legal standard can be characterized as the combination of the evidentiary preconditions 
that will trigger a presumption and an evidentiary standard to rebut the presumption.45 The optimal 
evidentiary standard would balance the direction and strength of the presumption with the 
reliability and cost of the available evidence. For example, suppose that the presumption is that 
some category of conduct is more likely harmful.46 A court could reflect this presumption (i) by 
treating the presumption as sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff’s initial burden, or (ii) by placing a 
relatively low burden of production of case-specific evidence on the plaintiff. The court also might 
place a higher burden of production or even persuasion on the defendant to rebut the plaintiff’s 
presumption and case-specific evidence. A stronger presumption and evidence of harm would raise 
the defendant’s rebuttal burden. The plaintiff’s burden of producing evidence of competitive harm 
analogously would be higher for presumptively procompetitive categories of conduct.  
The cost of information also suggests the potential benefits from a structured and 
sometimes truncated process.47 As we have noted, the term “per se illegality” describes an 
irrebuttable presumption of harm for certain categories of conduct. Philadelphia National Bank, 
the FTC and some courts have used the term “inherently suspect” to describe conduct that warrants 
a strong, but rebuttable presumption of likely harm, given certain other conditions.48 In some cases, 
the presumption may be insufficient by itself to shift the burden but might have a supporting role 
along with other case-specific evidence. Thus, this decision-theoretic approach can be used to 
interpret and extend the “sliding scale” approach to applying the rule of reason even in the absence 
of an anticompetitive presumption. 
Under the rule of reason, it might be useful to limit the amount of information necessary to 
evaluate competitive effect. Demanding more information in some cases can lead to more errors 
or worsened deterrence. Certain evidence may not be reasonably available or will be unreliable 
because it (i) too often signals an erroneous conclusion, or (ii) is too likely subject to confusion, 
                                                 
45
 These evidentiary rebuttal standards would include the respective burdens of pleading, production, and proof for 
plaintiffs and defendants. 
46
 Such a presumption might not be as simple as “conduct A is so likely to be anticompetitive that we presume it will 
be,” as is the case for some per se prohibitions. It might instead be that “conduct A, in the presence of Facts B, C, 
and D, is highly likely to be anticompetitive.” Such qualified presumptions have been used by the Supreme Court in 
connection with certain kinds of group boycotts, see Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing 
Co., 472 U.S. 284, 296–97 (1985), and tying, see Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12–16 
(1984). They similarly are used in merger law, where the anticompetitive presumption depends on the level of 
concentration and market shares of the merging firms as well as the change in concentration that the proposed 
merger will bring about. United States v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).  
47
 See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (noting that per se presumption “avoids the necessity 
for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry involved, 
as well as related industries”); FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 434 (1990) (observing that 
the justification for the per se rules is “rooted in administrative convenience”). 
48
 See Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 32–33 (D.C. Cir. 2005); In re Detroit Auto Dealers Ass’n, Inc., 
955 F.2d 457, 470–71 (6th Cir. 1992); North Texas Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346, 358–59 (5th Cir. 
2008).  
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misinterpretation, or bias by the trial court or jury.49 Collecting and presenting additional 
information is not costless and may have diminishing returns and only marginal benefits, if any.50 
Moreover, requiring additional evidence disadvantages the plaintiff, which has the initial burden 
and the ultimate burden of proof. It also can deter meritorious cases, leading to under-deterrence. 
B. The Chicago-School’s Reliance on Decision Theory to Support its Critique of Antitrust 
Chicago-School commentators applied a decision-theoretic framework to argue that 
antitrust law as it existed in the 1960s tended towards false positives, including over-deterrence of 
beneficial conduct. They attributed this tendency to a lack of appreciation for efficiency benefits 
of the allegedly anticompetitive conduct, undemanding burdens of proof on plaintiffs, bright line 
liability rules, and the limited competence and bias of antitrust decision-makers (i.e., agencies, 
courts, and juries) in evaluating competitive effects. These commentators also assumed that the 
costs of false positives far exceeded the costs of false negatives because any anticompetitive effects 
from under-enforcement would be dissipated by the self-correcting tendencies of markets, whereas 
false negatives would prove durable due to the longevity of legal precedent.51  
 They were especially skeptical of anticompetitive concerns regarding exclusionary 
conduct. They suggested that complaining rivals were highly likely to be inefficient competitors, 
who were attempting to use antitrust to prevent more efficient larger firms from competing on the 
merits to the benefit of consumers.52 Intrabrand vertical restraints were assumed to be 
procompetitive in most cases and potential exclusionary effects were dismissed or ignored.53 
Interbrand restraints, such as exclusive dealing, were assumed to be generally efficient, even if 
used by firms with substantial market power.54 Robert Bork argued that foreclosure was illusory 
                                                 
49
 See FED. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, 
undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”). See also FED. R. EVID. 702(c) (expert 
opinion testimony can be excluded if is not “the product of reliable principles and methods”). 
50
 The collection of evidence should be “proportional to the needs of the case,” including “whether the burden or 
expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
51
 See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 2. More recently, see Murat C. Mungen & Joshua D. Wright, Optimal 
Standards of Proof in Antitrust 19–20 (George Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Research No. 19-20, 2019), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3428771. 
52
 See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 35 (cautioning courts to “treat suits by horizontal competitors with the 
utmost suspicion”); William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition, 28 J.L. & 
ECON. 247, 248 (1985) (describing how firms seek antitrust protection from “the unpleasantness of effective 
competition”). 
53
 See, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical Restraints: De Facto Legality Under the Rule of Reason, 60 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 67 (1991); Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se 
Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1981). 
54
 Howard P. Marvel, Exclusive Dealing, 25 J. L & ECON. 1 (1982); Benjamin Klein & Andres V. Lerner, The 
Expanded Economics of Free‐Riding: How Exclusive Dealing Prevents Free‐Riding and Creates Undivided Loyalty, 
74 ANTITRUST L.J. 473 (2007); Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Exclusive Dealing Intensifies Competition for 
Distribution, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 433 (2008). 
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and could not harm competition because there was only a single monopoly profit.55 Commentators 
also suggested that monopolists drive innovation.56 
 These criticisms and the proposed solution of more permissive antitrust rules and higher 
burdens of proof have been highly influential. Intrabrand vertical restraints are no longer 
condemned per se as is also true for most exclusionary group boycotts. The per se prohibition of 
tying is teetering. Encouraged by Matsushita57 and Twombly,58 motions to dismiss and for 
summary judgment are now more commonly made. Courts and agencies also have become more 
sophisticated in evaluating economic arguments. Economic testimony is now the norm and subject 
to Daubert challenges.59 
 The assumptions underlying these criticisms also have been very influential in producing 
a non-interventionist bias in the law. For example, in Brooke Group, the Court expressed 
skepticism that the cigarette oligopolists would be able to coordinate successfully after disciplining 
a price-cutting rival, despite evidence that they had coordinated historically.60 The single 
monopoly profit theory was treated as a broad guide in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in 
Jefferson Parish61 and subsequent opinions by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor when they were 
appellate judges.62 The Supreme Court’s analysis in Trinko63 is partially based on the belief that 
monopolists are the main engines of future innovation and should be permitted to restrict 
competition to maintain their innovation incentives.64 Several courts concluded that exclusive 
                                                 
55
 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 137–38; 140, 372 (1978). 
56
 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 105 (1942). See also Dennis W. Carlton & 
Ken Heyer, Extraction v. Extension: The Basis for Formulating Antitrust Policy Towards Single-Firm Conduct, 4 
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 285, 290–92 (2008). 
57
 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–88 (1986) (revitalizing the use of 
summary judgment in antitrust cases). 
58
 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554–57 (2007) (raising the burden of pleading for plaintiffs to state a 
claim under Federal Rule 8(a)(2)). 
59
 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). See also FED R. EVID 702. 
60
 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 232 (1993) (describing tacit 
coordination among oligopolists as a means of recouping losses from predatory pricing as “highly speculative”). But 
see id. at 253–54 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the evidence was sufficient to show the required “reasonable 
possibility” of harm to competition). 
61
 Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 36 (1984) (O’Connor, J. concurring) (“The existence of a 
tied product normally does not increase the profit that the seller with market power can extract from sales of the 
tying product.”). 
62
 Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 23–24 (1st Cir. 1990) (Breyer, J.); E & L Consulting, Ltd. v. 
Doman Indus. Ltd., 472 F.3d 23, 30 (2d Cir. 2006) (Sotomayor, J.). 
63
 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
64
 Id. at 407 (“The opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for a short period—is what attracts ‘business 
acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth.”). For a critique of 
Trinko, see Andrew I. Gavil, Exclusionary Distribution Strategies by Dominant Firms: Striking a Better Balance, 72 
ANTITRUST L.J. 3, 41–51 (2004). 
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dealing contracts with durations of one year or less should be treated as presumptively lawful on 
the ground that they are easily contestable.65  
C. The Errors and Inapplicability of the Chicago-School Prescriptions for Current Antitrust 
Analysis 
   While the Chicago-School’s analysis provided useful criticisms of 1960s legal standards, 
they have gone too far in various ways. Modern economic analysis has now invalidated many of 
their criticisms.66 The overarching assumption that false positives are more concerning than false 
negatives because of rapid market self-correction is undermined by the observation that long-
lasting cartels with a significant number of participants have been observed. Market dominance 
can be quite durable, in some instances lasting for decades. Barriers to entry, specifically including 
barriers resulting from the incumbent monopolist’s exclusionary conduct, can prevent market self-
correction.67  
Chicagoans argued that competitor complaints were most likely motivated by the fear of 
increased competition, which has led to skepticism of such complaints, including denial of 
standing,68 and has been extended to promote ex ante credibility judgments of witnesses, both 
positive and negative.69 In fact, the interests of competitors whose costs are raised by exclusionary 
conduct are consistent with the interests of consumers whose prices are raised as a result. While 
antitrust protects “competition not competitors,” that does not mean that competitors’ interests 
necessarily are opposed to consumer interests. It is especially suspect when the conduct of a firm 
with substantial market power has the effect of excluding a rival that is the embodiment of market 
“self-correction.”70 
 Modern analysis also has invalidated the Chicagoan critiques of exclusionary conduct by 
firms with substantial market power. The claim that anticompetitive exclusion would be 
                                                 
65
 See, e.g., Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 395 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.) (“Exclusive-
dealing contracts terminable in less than a year are presumptively lawful.”). For a discussion of the relevant cases 
and the critique of this view, see GAVIL, ET AL. supra note 27, at 1038–39. 
66
 For an excellent catalogue of these assumptions as they relate both to markets and institutions, see Baker, supra 
note 3, at 8–36 (analyzing nine such “erroneous assumptions”). See also Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core 
Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 527 (2013). 
67
 See BAKER, supra note 6, at 17 (citing evidence that cartels, oligopolies, and monopolies have been more durable 
than predicted by Chicago-School critics). See also Steven C. Salop, The Raising Rivals' Cost Foreclosure 
Paradigm, Conditional Pricing Practices, and the Flawed Incremental Price-Cost Test, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 371, 
391-92 (2017) (describing how foreclosure can be used to thwart market-correcting entry). 
68
 Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986) (finding the allegations of nation's fifth-largest beef 
packing company about results of merger of second and third largest beef packing companies were insufficient to 
show threat of antitrust injury as result of predatory pricing necessary to enjoin merger under Clayton Act). See also 
Baumol & Ordover, supra note 52, at 248–49. 
69
 Some courts have openly questioned the credibility of witnesses employed by the plaintiff as self-interested, yet 
credited, without similar scrutiny, the testimony of the obviously self-interested parties defending their conduct. See, 
e.g., United States v. AT & T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 227, 229–30 (D.D.C. 2018), aff'd sub nom. United States v. 
AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
70
 See, e.g., Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 951 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[I]n a concentrated 
market with very high barriers to entry, competition will not exist without competitors”). 
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unprofitable because there is only a single monopoly profit has been shown to be invalid except in 
one highly unrealistic set of market conditions.71 It also overlooks the fact that exclusionary 
conduct can insulate a firm with legitimately-achieved monopoly power from new competitive 
threats that might weaken or undo its market dominance.72 The idea that entrants can overcome 
exclusives simply by outbidding monopolists for needed inputs fails to recognize that entrants face 
disadvantages in bidding against monopolists that hold exclusives, even if the exclusives are only 
short-term.73 This is because a dominant firm typically has more profits to protect by maintaining 
its monopoly rather than facing a competitive market than an entrant can gain by achieving 
viability in a competitive market.74   
Chicagoans similarly overlook a key fact about private antitrust litigation that flows from 
the asymmetric effects of competition on the profits of the incumbent monopolist versus an entrant 
or small competitor. Antitrust defendants typically have systematically higher litigation stakes than 
do private plaintiffs. This asymmetry distorts litigation incentives and likely leads to a higher 
incidence of false negative errors. In an exclusionary conduct matter, for example, the defendant 
is attempting to maintain or increase its ability to exercise market power. Its litigation stakes from 
an injunction are equal to the reduction in profits from its resulting loss in market power. An entrant 
attempting to weaken that market power by enjoining the conduct so that it can compete in the 
more competitive market has stakes equal to its competitive profits. These stakes are highly 
asymmetric because competitive profits typically are much lower than monopoly profits. They 
also are asymmetric because the benefits of the injunction often would be shared with other 
competitors. Damages (even if trebled) are a one-to-one transfer payment, which raise the stakes 
equally to both parties but do not eliminate the asymmetric stakes from the injunction.75 
Because a defendant with substantial market power has higher stakes in an exclusionary 
conduct case, it has systematic incentives to invest in higher litigation effort than the plaintiff in 
order to tilt the outcome somewhat in its favor, relative to the underlying merits of the case.  These 
asymmetric litigation investment incentives have the effect of increasing false negatives and 
                                                 
71
 See, e.g., Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to 
Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986); Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power through 
Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515 (1985); B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, Exclusive Dealing, 106 J. 
POL. ECON. 64 (1998). 
72
 Kaplow, supra note 71, at 520–21; Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 71, at 246. See also Dennis W. Carlton & 
Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries, 33 
RAND J. ECON. 194 (2002).  
73
 See Salop, The Raising Rivals' Cost Foreclosure Paradigm, supra note 67, at 407–15. This mistake was evident in 
Judge Easterbrook’s decision in Paddock Pubs., Inc. v. Chicago Tribune Co., 103 F.3d 42, 47 (7th Cir. 1996), where 
he concluded that that a rival excluded by exclusive contracts should “try to outbid” the two dominant incumbents 
“in the marketplace, rather than to outmaneuver them in court.” 
74
 Salop, supra note 67, at 408–10. In addition, distributors’ fears that the entrant will fail can become a self-
fulfilling prophecy by leading them to accept exclusives from the monopolist even if the entrant offers a premium. 
75
 Treble damages do increase the incentive to bring cases, which can increase deterrence. But it is unlikely to offset 
the other deterrence-reducing effects. 
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reducing false positives.76 Many rules of procedure and evidence, despite judicial oversight, also 
provide ample opportunities for strategic use of litigation to delay, raise plaintiffs’ litigation costs 
and further tilt outcomes. Moreover, by the time a case is decided, a rival may have exited the 
market or been so hobbled that it no longer poses a significant competitive threat, which renders 
injunctive relief ineffective. These factors collectively reduce the plaintiff’s incentive to bring suit, 
which leads to further under-deterrence.   
 It has long been recognized that the pursuit of monopoly spurs innovation.77 However, this 
argument is sometimes misinterpreted to suggest that monopoly, once achieved, benefits 
consumers because the monopolist’s future innovation incentives exceed the incentives of their 
would-be rivals.78 In fact, monopolists have less incentive to innovate because they already have 
a monopoly market share, whereas fringe competitors have the potential to grow their shares. What 
mainly incentivizes a monopolist is the fear of losing out to new competitors. Moreover, that fear 
also incentivizes the monopolist to engage in exclusionary conduct to erect barriers against these 
potential innovators. This incentive can be further amplified if the plaintiff’s standard of proof has 
been raised based on mistaken assumptions.79 
 There are exceptions to the judicial success of these non-interventionist assumptions about 
exclusionary conduct. In Actavis, the Court recognized that an innovator that legitimately has 
obtained a patent monopoly should not be permitted to strike agreements with potential entrants 
that would exclude them from the market for some period of time. In Leegin, the Court recognized 
exclusionary conduct concerns from resale price maintenance. It explained how vertical restraints 
can be used to maintain single firm market power by foreclosing innovative retailers or 
manufacturers.80 Similarly, several circuit courts have recognized the significant anticompetitive 
concerns from exclusive dealing and similar conduct by firms with substantial market power, 
especially when implemented in response to new competitive challenges.81  
In Microsoft, the D.C. Circuit explained how exclusionary conduct can erect 
anticompetitive entry barriers to nascent innovation competitors.82 The court also rejected a 
permissible legal rule in favor of applying the structure of the Section 1 rule of reason standard to 
                                                 
76
 For further analysis, see Erik Hovenkamp & Steven C. Salop, Asymmetric Stakes in Antitrust Litigation, (January 
5, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).  
77
 SCHUMPETER, supra note56, at 105. 
78
 Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004) (describing the possession 
of monopoly power as an important element of free-market system). 
79
 See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 575 (2007). See also infra note 123. 
80
 Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 893 (2007) (“A dominant retailer, for example, 
might request resale price maintenance to forestall innovation in distribution that decreases costs.”). 
81
 See, e.g., McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814 (11th Cir. 2015); ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254 
(3d Cir. 2012); United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005); Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 
290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2002). 
82
 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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Section 2 allegations.83 In ZF Meritor, the Third Circuit declined to apply a Brooke Group-style 
price/cost test to loyalty discounts accompanied by other exclusionary contract restrictions, relying 
instead on a similar, burden-shifting structure.84 In McWane, the Eleventh Circuit also applied a 
Section 1 rule of reason approach to exclusive dealing and declined to adopt a procompetitive 
presumption.85 The courts in both McWane and Dentsply found that the claimed efficiency benefits 
were invalid or non-existent, as did the Microsoft court for most of the challenged restraints.86   
 Despite this progress, the skeptical assumptions of the conservatives continue to run deep 
in antitrust analysis and law. Plaintiffs continue to face arguments about conduct, institutions, and 
market structure to persuade courts to impose overly demanding burdens of production and proof. 
Most recently, in Ohio v. American Express Company, the Court declined to rely on direct evidence 
of anticompetitive effect of the challenged exclusionary vertical restraints in the context of a two-
sided platform. It instead mandated that proof of market power through circumstantial evidence in 
the form of a defined relevant market also was required despite the fact that the direct evidence of 
anticompetitive effects on consumers also proved that the defendant had market power.87  
 In light of this history, the time has come to consider more systematically how a more 
modern analysis should be combined with the insights of decision theory to update antitrust 
presumptions and the burden of proof placed on plaintiffs under the rule of reason in exclusionary 
conduct challenges. In this way, the sliding-scale “enquiry meet for the case” can be formulated 
for the current market environment. Analysis based on mistaken assumptions and mistaken 
applications of decision theory are particularly worrisome in light of the growing role of “new 
economy” markets that involve network effects and economies of scale that often naturally tip 
these markets to dominance or monopoly and lead to durable barriers to entry.88 These barriers can 
be maintained or enhanced in the face of innovative potential entrants by technological as well as 
                                                 
83
 Id. at 59. 
84
 ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 277 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[B]ecause price itself was not the clearly 
predominant mechanism of exclusion, the price-cost cases are inapposite, and the rule of reason is the proper 
framework in which to evaluate Plaintiff’s claims.”). 
85
 McWane, 783 F.3d at 833–35. 
86
 Id. at 840–42; Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 196–97; Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 62–64; 66–67; 71–72. 
87
 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2285 n.7 (2018) (emphasis added). As Justice Breyer points out in 
dissent, the Court’s previous recognition that direct evidence of competitive harm is sufficient to shift a burden of 
production to the defendant and require a showing procompetitive effects should have been “fully applicable” in the 
case. Id. at 2296 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Breyer further observed that “[t]he majority thus, in a footnote, seems 
categorically to exempt vertical restraints from the ordinary ‘rule of reason’ analysis that has applied to them since 
the Sherman Act’s enactment in 1890” and adds that “[o]ne critical point that the majority’s argument ignores is that 
proof of actual adverse effects on competition is, a fortiori, proof of market power. Without such power, the 
restraints could not have brought about the anticompetitive effects that the plaintiff proved.” Id. at 2297. 
88
 In the Second Edition of his antitrust law treatise, Judge Posner recognized the greater concerns about 
exclusionary conduct in “new economy” markets such as internet platforms with network effects. However, he still 
proposed that the monopolist is entitled to use practices that are employed widely in industries that resemble the 
monopolist’s but are competitive. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 253–54 (2d ed. 2001). 
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traditional exclusionary conduct such as exclusive dealing, tying and vertical mergers, as well as 
by serial acquisition strategies that eliminate the most promising potential competitors.89 
  
III. RECOMMENDED GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR OPERATIONALIZING THE “ENQUIRY MEET FOR 
THE CASE” FOR ANTICOMPETITIVE EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT  
 
 California Dental,90 Leegin91 and Actavis92 invited courts to continue to formulate 
evidentiary burdens, including presumptions, as they gain more experience under the rule of 
reason. In response to that invitation, we propose a set of “guiding principles” for courts evaluating 
the competitive effects of exclusionary conduct. These proposals reflect decision theory, modern 
economic analysis and legal precedent, and current market conditions. They are intended to 
structure the inquiry in a rational way, correcting for the various mistaken assumptions that 
exaggerate current perceptions of the likelihood of false positives, understate concerns for false 
negatives, and impose excessive burdens on plaintiffs.   
In the conventional rule of reason decision framework, the plaintiff bears the initial burden 
of producing sufficient evidence of likely competitive harm. It can satisfy this burden with direct 
or circumstantial evidence, an appropriate anticompetitive presumption, or some combination. If 
the plaintiff satisfies this requirement, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to provide 
justifications, that is, sufficient evidence of cognizable procompetitive benefits of the challenged 
conduct.93 If the defendant satisfies this requirement, the burden of production then shifts back to 
the plaintiff, who bears the ultimate burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence, i.e., 
that the conduct is more likely to be anticompetitive than not. 
This is a sliding scale standard in that stronger evidence of competitive harm (or a stronger 
anticompetitive presumption) requires the defendant to produce stronger evidence of efficiency 
benefits, and vice versa. A procompetitive presumption analogously would require the plaintiff to 
provide stronger evidence of competitive harm. The inevitable uncertainty that accompanies 
antitrust decision-making requires reasonable means of assessing and determining the probability 
of competitive harm in the first step, including the relevant presumptions.  
 
                                                 
89
 Indeed, while no single acquisition is likely to “substantially lessen competition” and so violate Section 7, the 
series might be susceptible to analysis as monopolizing conduct under Section 2. 
90
 California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779–80 (1999). 
91
 Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 879 (2007) (“Courts can, for example, devise 
rules over time for offering proof, or even presumptions where justified, to make the rule of reason a fair and 
efficient way to prohibit anticompetitive restraints and to promote procompetitive ones.”). 
92
 FTC v. Actavis, 570 U.S. 136, 158–60 (2013).  
93
 A presumption may be rebutted by evidence discrediting its basis or “affirmatively” offsetting its implication.  
United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990).  If discredited, the presumption carries no 
weight in the post-rebuttal decision process.  But, if offset, it continues to carry some weight in the decision process. 
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We propose a number of principles to guide the implementation of this framework, 
including the allocation of burdens and the adoption of anticompetitive and procompetitive 
presumptions. 
 
A. Basic Structure of the Inquiry and Allocation of Burdens 
 
1. The Default Presumption Under the Rule of Reason Should Be “Neutral” 
Competitive Effects  
 Civil antitrust claims generally do not warrant different treatment than any other kind of 
civil enforcement. The rule of reason benchmark standard requires the plaintiff to prove that 
anticompetitive effects are “more likely than not,” or, as it applies to all civil antitrust cases, “by a 
preponderance of the evidence.” This evidentiary standard is consistent with a “neutral” 
presumption of likely competitive effects, that is, that the category of conduct is no more likely to 
reduce consumer welfare than to increase welfare.94  
 
 For example, Leegin adopted the conventional rule of reason, which requires the plaintiff 
to show likely anticompetitive effects by a preponderance of the evidence. While it eliminated the 
previous anticompetitive presumption, it also detailed circumstances under which minimum resale 
price maintenance could be anticompetitive, and adopted a neutral ex ante presumption, not a 
procompetitive presumption. 
 
 The next several principles explain the appropriate evidentiary burden on the plaintiff. 
 
2. The Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Burden Should Not Be Elevated Ex Ante 
a. The Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Burden Should Be Probable Anticompetitive 
Effects, Not Actual Anticompetitive Effects  
 As discussed in Part I, the rule of reason has always focused on probable anticompetitive 
effects and “tendency.” It should be sufficient for the plaintiff to satisfy its initial burden and 
shift the burden to the defendant by showing either actual or probable anticompetitive harm, not 
definitive proof. 
 
b. The Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Burden Should Not Require Quantification  
 Courts should not require quantification of harm as part of the plaintiff’s burden.   
Quantification evidence of “actual” harm is not required by the leading cases, which simply 
                                                 
94
 The fact that ties are resolved in favor of the defendant might suggest that the presumption is “marginally 
procompetitive” rather than “neutral.” If so, the “margin” is considered very small. But see Mungen & Wright, supra 
note 50 (advocating a higher than preponderance standard for antitrust).  
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recognize that direct evidence of likely harm obviates the need for circumstantial proof.95  
Moreover, imposing a requirement of evidence of actual harm would move the needle from 
reasonable probability closer to a standard of near-certainty more typically associated with 
criminal prosecution and likely would lead to excessive false negatives.  
 
 A quantification requirement also would add substantial and unnecessary additional cost 
resulting from discovery and protracted litigation over expert methodologies. No empirical 
methodology is perfect and complete and accurate information is likely to be rare, so some 
criticisms can be made of even the most rigorous and careful empirical methodology. Evaluating 
the importance of the criticisms can be difficult for generalist courts facing significant docket 
pressures. This distortion is exacerbated by the fact that the standard test for statistical significance 
of econometric results is focused on avoiding false positives and places no value on avoiding false 
negatives.96 
3.  Direct Proof of Market Power or Anticompetitive Effects Should Obviate the Need 
for Circumstantial Proof  
 When reliable direct evidence of market power or anticompetitive effect is presented, 
courts should not require plaintiffs also to demonstrate market power with circumstantial evidence 
by defining a relevant market, calculating market shares, and evaluating barriers to entry. As the 
Court observed in Indiana Federation of Dentists, market power inferred from market shares in a 
defined market is a second best “surrogate” and is unnecessary when more direct evidence of 
market power or anticompetitive effects is provided. 
 
 In evaluating exclusionary conduct, courts also should avoid the false negatives that would 
result from failing to connect the market power analysis to the allegations of anticompetitive effect. 
In a monopoly maintenance case, for example, a court should not evaluate the profitability of price 
increases since the allegation centers on conduct designed to prevent price decreases.97 Courts 
also should not immunize exclusionary conduct by monopolists by using a threshold market power 
filter to conclude that a firm lacks monopoly power because it faces competition when it is accused 
of using that power to impair or destroy those very competitors. 
 
 In American Express,98 the Court required the plaintiff to prove market power in the two-
sided platform with circumstantial evidence, despite the fact that direct evidence of anticompetitive 
effects was provided and should have been sufficient economic proof of market power. Imposing 
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that additional requirement is inefficient and merely raises the plaintiff’s cost, while potentially 
masking the defendant’s lack of sufficient justification because it prevents the burden from 
shifting. It makes no economic or legal sense to require inferior evidence when superior evidence 
already has been provided. If the Court wished to raise the plaintiff’s evidentiary burden, it would 
have been better to require additional evidence of harm, as discussed below.99 
4. Courts Should Set a Lower Burden On The Plaintiff in Exclusionary Conduct Cases 
When the Defendant Has Substantial Market Power 
 Anticompetitive effects are more likely when the defendant has substantial market power. 
Moreover, when the defendant has substantial market power, the asymmetric litigation incentive 
effects from its higher stakes lead to false negatives. Both of these factors suggest that courts 
should resist imposing elevated burdens on plaintiffs in such circumstances and should instead 
impose a lower burden to reflect the greater probability of competitive harm and the distinct 
challenges of litigation against a dominant firm. This is consistent with the sliding scale and the 
view that behavior by monopolists should be viewed through a “special lens,” precisely because 
its power may provide it with the ability and incentive to engage in exclusionary conduct.100 We 
are not, however, suggesting that substantial market power without additional evidence warrants 
a presumption of competitive harm.    
 As we have explained, many of the arguments that firms possessing market power lack 
incentives to carry out exclusionary conduct have been debunked. Market self-correction requires 
existing competitors or new entrants that can expand in response to attempts to raise or maintain 
monopoly prices. But monopoly power includes entry barriers, and exclusionary conduct often 
raises barriers to entry. If there are no competitors who are not subject to the exclusionary conduct, 
this self-correction process cannot occur.101   
The plaintiff’s evidentiary burden also should be reduced to reflect the asymmetric 
litigation stakes and the associated increased likelihood of false negatives. As discussed earlier, 
these asymmetric stakes give defendants with substantial market power systematic incentives to 
invest in relatively greater litigation efforts. These asymmetric litigation incentives tilt outcomes 
in the direction of excessive false negatives.  
 Despite the substantial harms caused by monopolizing conduct, the plaintiff’s burden in 
Section 2 monopolization cases often was treated as higher. One reason was grounded in remedial 
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concerns. The traditional remedy for monopolization was “capital punishment,” the disintegration 
of the firm into separate parts, as in Standard Oil or the AT&T settlement.102 But it is now 
recognized that remedial concerns in Section 2 cases can be separated from liability standards 
because other equitable remedies, such as divestitures short of complete dissolution or behavioral 
remedies, may be mandated instead.103 A second reason may have been the assumption made 
explicit by the Court in Copperweld that unilateral exclusionary conduct is less of a threat to 
competition than concerted action under Section 1.104 But concerted action by rivals in highly 
competitive markets is unlikely to threaten competition to the same extent as unilateral 
exclusionary conduct by a firm possessing substantial market power.  
   
5. The Plaintiff’s Initial Evidentiary Burden Should Be Reduced To Reflect The Possible 
Absence of  a Valid Efficiency Justification  
 The conventional statement of the burden-shifting rule of reason typically suggests that the 
defendant’s justifications must be totally ignored unless and until the plaintiff produces sufficient 
evidence of competitive harm, where that evidence does not include any reference to the possible 
lack of cognizable justifications. Such a rigid sequencing approach can lead to excessive false 
negatives.105  
 Evaluating competitive harm first and in isolation in exclusionary conduct cases involving 
dominant firms is not compelled or even suggested by decision theory106 and doing so is 
inconsistent with a sliding scale approach to the burden of proof which evaluates all of the 
evidence.107 Moreover, the courts have long acknowledged that evidence of the defendant’s 
purpose in adopting certain restraints can be probative for evaluating the likelihood of competitive 
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effects.108 The absence of a cognizable justification, for example, can strengthen a presumption of 
harm.109  
If consideration of the justifications is deferred, then the plaintiff’s burden to show 
competitive harm should be set at a low level to account for the fact that any efficiency claims may 
turn out to be pretextual, invalid or very small, and often are. This approach would allow the 
sequential burden-shifting structure to be maintained without causing excessive false negatives.110  
 
6. The Defendant Should Not be Able to Meet its Burden of Production to Show 
Cognizable Efficiency Benefits Based on Purely Categorical Justifications   
 Categorical justifications might be used to support a procompetitive presumption. But 
general categorical evidence of benefits should not be sufficient to carry the defendant’s burden 
once the plaintiff produces evidence of probable competitive harm. Case-specific evidence then 
must be produced to support efficiency claims to support the application of the theory to the 
particular case. Permitting purely theoretical justifications to satisfy the defendant’s burden in a 
particular case would amount to a sub rosa presumption and would lead to excessive false 
negatives. Justifications must be evaluated solely with the case-specific evidence when there is no 
procompetitive presumption. For example, the fact that some exclusive dealing arrangements may 
be procompetitive does not mean that the one at issue is procompetitive.  
 This is consistent with the treatment of theoretical evidence of competitive harm. A 
plaintiff may be able to defeat a motion to dismiss if it explains its theory of harm and if its claim 
is supported by allegations sufficient to make the claim plausible. But case-specific evidence is 
required to avoid summary judgement. The same approach should be followed with respect to 
theoretical evidence of efficiency benefits. 
   
7. Courts Should Subject Defendant’s Justifications to a Less Restrictive Alternative 
Standard  
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 Courts should consider whether the claimed procompetitive benefits can be achieved in 
large part through less restrictive alternatives that involve significantly lessened competitive 
concerns. For example, once a defendant has shifted the burden back to the plaintiff by showing 
a procompetitive justification, the plaintiff should be able to shift the burden back to the 
defendant by identifying a plausible less restrictive alternative. At that point the burden would 
shift back to the defendant to demonstrate why that alternative is not feasible or would not 
achieve most or substantially all of the efficiency benefits. This allocation of burdens makes 
sense since the defendant has superior information regarding efficiencies.111 
 
B. Guiding Principles for Adopting Procompetitive Presumptions for Exclusionary Conduct 
by Firms with Substantial Market Power 
1. Substantial Evidence Should Be Required to Justify Procompetitive Presumptions  
 In light of the heightened concern about the anticompetitive effects of exclusionary conduct 
by firms with substantial market power, adoption of procompetitive presumptions for such conduct 
should be rare and endorsed only under exceptional circumstances.  Compared to the state of 
antitrust law in the 1960s, defendants today have far more effective and robust procedural options 
at hand to identify and eliminate truly weak antitrust claims through motions to dismiss, motions 
for summary judgment, and motions to exclude expert testimony. Procompetitive presumptions, 
therefore, should be narrowly tailored and justified by substantial theoretical or empirical 
categorical evidence.   
a. Narrow Categories 
 Presumptions involving categories of conduct should be narrowly drawn and courts should 
be cautious about generalizing either from one type of conduct to another or from conduct in 
competitive settings to highly concentrated markets. The fact that a class of conduct sometimes 
creates plausible procompetitive benefits may be a reason to reject an irrebuttable anticompetitive 
presumption, but it does not justify a procompetitive presumption. Moreover, the fact that certain 
conduct is carried out by firms lacking market power in competitive markets does not mean that 
such conduct would be procompetitive in an oligopoly market or when implemented by a firm 
with substantial market power.112 Thus, while that evidence may be probative in a particular case, 
where the conditions are sufficiently similar, it cannot justify a procompetitive presumption. 
 For example, while conceding that vertical intrabrand restraints can have procompetitive 
virtues and therefore did not warrant per se condemnation, neither Leegin nor Sylvania endorsed a 
presumption that they were more likely procompetitive than anticompetitive. Instead, both restored 
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a neutral competitive presumption.113 Similarly, the fact that certain intrabrand vertical restraints 
may be useful in achieving procompetitive efficiencies does not mean that a procompetitive 
presumption should be applied to interbrand vertical restraints. Neither Leegin nor Sylvania made 
judgments about interbrand vertical restraints with possible exclusionary effects, such as exclusive 
dealing or most-favored nation (“MFN”) provisions.114  
 Similarly, just as the fact that certain conduct is “horizontal” does not automatically justify 
an anticompetitive presumption, “vertical” conduct should not lead automatically to a 
procompetitive presumption. Labelling the conduct as “horizontal” or “vertical,” without more, 
provides insufficient information to formulate any generally applicable presumption. While 
conduct might be vertical in form, any anticompetitive effects are horizontal.115 
  
b. False Positives and False Negatives 
 Chicago-School claims about false negatives were formulated at a time when courts were 
relying on relatively low burdens of proof and arguably expansive anticompetitive presumptions, 
including a number of per se prohibitions. Those concerns are now anachronistic and largely 
overstated given the evolution of the conventional rule of reason. The enforcement agencies and 
the courts also have become more knowledgeable and experienced in evaluating economic 
evidence. For this reason, it makes sense today to assume that the error costs from false positives 
and false negatives are relatively equal. Substantial evidence about the particular category of 
conduct should be required, therefore, to justify placing greater weight on false positives.  
 It will seldom be possible to gauge the impact of alternative legal rules (aside from per se 
rules) on deterrence.  If the legal standard is stable, it is hard to quantify the relative number and 
competitive impact of additional false negatives versus fewer false positives if the law were made 
more permissive.116 However, deterrence policy concerns could alter the presumption in highly 
exceptional circumstances. For example, Brooke Group created a procompetitive presumption for 
price cuts in response to competition that remain above costs, based on the view that such price 
cuts are a natural competitive response, immediately benefit consumers, and any line drawing by 
courts would lead to a severe risk of deterring beneficial price cuts.117 
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2. When an Appropriate Procompetitive Presumption Is Adopted, It Should Raise the 
Plaintiff’s Burden to Show Competitive Harm, Not Append Additional Evidentiary 
Requirements   
      If it is appropriate to place a higher burden of proof on the plaintiff, the rule of reason can 
accommodate that standard by requiring the plaintiff to prove that the harm is “disproportionately 
higher” than the benefits, as suggested by Professor Hovenkamp.118 By contrast, in setting a higher 
burden on the plaintiff (apparently because the conduct was labelled “vertical”), the Court in 
American Express required the plaintiff to prove market power by circumstantial evidence despite 
the fact that better, direct evidence of anticompetitive effects already was provided.119 Even if it 
were justified, it would have made more sense for the Court to require a stronger showing of 
anticompetitive effects, rather than adding unnecessary evidence of market power simply as a 
make-weight.120 
 As another example, it has been suggested that the plaintiff should be required to provide 
evidence that that the defendant’s conduct would make “no economic sense” in the absence of 
gaining monopoly power in addition to evidence of anticompetitive effects.121 This approach 
would redirect the rule of reason inquiry away from its proper, sole focus on competitive effects. 
Instead of merely showing that the challenged conduct was anticompetitive, plaintiffs also would 
have to show something completely different: that the conduct would not have been profitable for 
the dominant firm absent its contribution to the maintenance of market power.122  
 
3. Alleged Innovation Benefits of Monopoly Should Not Justify a Procompetitive 
Presumption for Exclusionary Conduct by Firms with Substantial Market Power 
 Courts should not permit monopolists to justify exclusionary conduct by arguing that their 
resulting monopoly profits will spur future innovation. As discussed earlier, economic analysis 
and associated empirical evidence do not support the general claim that a monopoly market 
structure leads to more innovation. While firms innovate in the hopes of achieving a monopoly, 
achieving a durable monopoly does not lead to more future innovation. To the contrary, significant 
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evidence suggests that competition, not monopoly, spurs innovation.123 It is fear of losing the 
monopoly that spurs the monopolist. Moreover, if the exclusionary conduct raises competitors’ 
costs or barriers to entry, innovation by potential rivals would be expected to fall, which would 
reduce the monopolist’s need to innovate. Permitting this justification also is contrary to 
overarching antitrust policy favoring an unencumbered competitive process. It also distorts the 
incentives for monopolists in favor of exclusionary strategies rather than competition on the merits. 
 
4. Complaints About Exclusionary Conduct By a Competitor Neither Justify a 
Procompetitive Presumption Nor Imposition of a Higher Evidentiary Burden on the 
Plaintiff  
 Competitors serve as an early trip-wire for competitive concerns about exclusionary 
conduct. The interests of foreclosed competitors are consistent with consumer welfare in 
exclusionary conduct cases since raising rivals’ costs will lead to higher consumer prices, so the 
rivals’ harm is antitrust injury. The shibboleth that antitrust law protects “competition, not 
competitors” should not be used to dismiss legitimate exclusionary conduct concerns of rivals or 
to attack the credibility of their testimony on the grounds that it reflects their “self-interests.”124 
Nor should courts treat the testimony of competitor witnesses as less credible than the testimony 
of the executives of a defendant’s company, whose testimony also reflects their own interests, 
which may be to achieve or maintain market power. “Shoot the messenger” as a defense strategy 
should be rejected as distraction. 
 
CONCLUSION 
  
The capacity of antitrust law to identify, redress, and deter anticompetitive exclusionary 
conduct has been systematically weakened over time. While there was a need for certain 
adjustments fifty years ago, continued reliance on the assumptions and presumptions that led to an 
overly permissive approach are no longer supportable. The evidentiary burdens courts now impose 
on plaintiffs are overly demanding and likely lead to under-deterrence. They are also handicapping 
the ability of antitrust enforcement to respond to the challenges of today’s technology-driven 
economy. 
 We have explained how current law is flexible enough again to adjust its standards in light 
of modern economic analysis informed by decision theory. We have also proposed a number of 
guiding principles to update standards of proof, including the use of presumptions. In this way, the 
sliding-scale “enquiry meet for the case” can be implemented for the current market environment. 
As Frank Easterbrook once argued, there is no natural “ratchet” in antitrust law that channels its 
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evolution only in one direction.125 For Easterbrook, that meant imposing more demanding 
standards of proof. But the same lack of ratchet should apply today as the continuing evolution of 
technology markets and modern economics suggest that greater antitrust vigilance is needed. 
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